This paper investigates the aggregate relationship between cohort fertility and female educational attainment in Croatia. Numerous demographic studies have examined the link between fertility and the level of education. However, newer research indicates that the field of education might also play a role when trying to explain fertility behavior. We contribute to existing literature on macro-level factors related to reproductive outcomes by considering both the level and field of education as possible sources of cohort fertility differentials. The main goal of the present study is to assess the effect of structural changes in educational attainment on cohort fertility decline by means of demographic decomposition techniques. Our analysis is based on detailed 2011 Census data, which provide information on the number of livebirths by mother's year of birth, birth order, marital status and educational attainment (i.e. the level and field of education). The results of our decomposition analyses reveal the dominance of the structural effect in explaining the overall completed fertility decline in Croatia. We assumed that the changing distribution of women by field of education at least partially accounts for the observed patterns in completed fertility but found no strong evidence in support of the outlined hypothesis.
Introduction 1
Fertility is a demographic process that can lead to significant changes in population size and structure, especially over the long run. In 1957, when the baby-boom era was in full swing in many western industrialized countries, below-replacement reproduction regime 2 started to manifest itself in socialist Croatia (Breznik et al., 1972) . Persistently low fertility levels did not go without consequence: Croatia's population has been declining for a quarter of a century, now reaching the same size as over 50 years ago. 3 A decreasing birth rate after the World War II came as a result of many factors, the most significant being the war losses of men, political and economic emigration, de-ruralisation and forced post-war industrialisation (Wertheimer-Baletić, 1971 ). Contrary to other socialist countries, Yugoslavia had difficulties in implementing pronatalist measures, largely due to high birth rates in some of its federal republics and autonomous provinces (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo) . So, in spite of Croatia being a low fertility country for decades, universal pronatalist measures have not been introduced to the national policy agenda up until the 1990s.
Domestic demographers agree that development strategies introduced during the post-war period contributed to downward fertility trends over the 1960s (Wertheimer-Baletić, 1971 ). Communist authorities gave priority to developing heavy industries. On the other hand, consumer industries, housing and services were mainly put aside. The rapid growth of industrial capacities occurred without significant technological progress and was accompanied by a rather low productivity, thus creating space for a large labour demand (Sirotković, 1996) . As the male labour force was already highly active, the resulting gap was offset by a substantial increase in female economic activity.
The economic transition from socialism to capitalism in Croatia took place during the 1990s, under war circumstances, when almost a third of industrial capacities had been destroyed (Sirotković, 1996) . The role of state in providing employment, social services and benefits underwent change over that period. Public enterprises lost their social function. The pressure of high unemployment, job insecurity and wage reductions made an influence on life events, including reproductive outcomes of generations born during the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Women born during the 1930s already exhibited below-replacement completed fertility. Many socioeconomic variables, including education, therefore no longer affected childbearing behaviour in the same way as over the periods of higher fertility (Breznik, 1991) . This is not unexpected, as previous research on determinants of fertility in Yugoslavia found the weakest association between level of education and childbearing during a low fertility regime (Rašević, 1971) .
From the 1950s up until the 1980s, the gender gap in economic activity was gradually decreasing in Croatia. As compared to male economic activity, female labour market participation grew much faster (Kerovec, 2003) . Hence, women's share of total employment increased steadily over the specified time interval. In 1952, female employment accounted for roughly 28% of total employment. In 1978, this proportion went up to 39% (Prpić, 1979 ). An upward trend continued up until the end of the 20 th century, achieving its maximum at 46% in 1997 (Kerovec, 2003) . Simultaneously, female education experienced a marked improvement. In 1960, women accounted for 32.8% of students who graduated from higher education institutions. This proportion rose to 44.6% in 1980, came to 53.7% in 1990 and reached as much as 60.8% in 2010 (CBS, 2016a) . However, a deeper insight into female career opportunities reveals a lingering horizontal gender segregation. Certain professions are still typically female dominant (e.g. education, health and welfare) (CBS, 2016a) .
Accordingly, this paper investigates the aggregate relationship between completed fertility and educational attainment in Croatia. The focus is on women born between 1930 and 1970. The specified time span allows us to investigate childbearing patterns over a period ranging from the baby boom up until post-socialist transition years in Croatia. We contribute to existing literature on macro-level factors related to childbearing outcomes (see e.g. Brzozowska, 2015) by considering both level of education and field of education as possible sources of completed fertility differentials. Our research is based on detailed 2011 Population Census data. The main goal of the present study is to assess the effects of compositional changes in educational attainment on completed fertility dynamics. We introduce marital status as an additional factor in our analyses.
In line with previous research (see the next chapter), we expect to find large and persistent differences in completed fertility by level of education. We hypothesise that the overall completed fertility decline in Croatia can be attributed to female educational expansion. Moreover, we expect women trained to perform jobs in education, health and welfare to exhibit higher completed fertility across cohorts. A changing distribution of female population by field of education might, therefore, also play a role in explaining childbearing patterns.
Theoretical Background and Previous Research
In low fertility settings, education usually remains constant throughout a woman's prime reproductive ages. This makes it a particularly suitable indicator when comparing fertility levels across different age cohorts. Moreover, education is shown to be one of the major drivers of the increase in female labour market participation. A large body of literature links women's education and employment to fertility behaviour and workfamily balance (Blossfeld, Huinik, 1991; Liefbroer, Corijn, 1999; Brewster, Rindfuss, 2000) .
Demographers (Martín-García, 2008; Balbo et al., 2013) recognise female education as one of the main determinants of the timing of first births, and of overall fertility levels. Therefore, numerous studies have examined the link between fertility and women's educational level (e.g. Hoem, 1986; Blossfeld, Huinik, 1991; Liefbroer, Corijn, 1999; Skirbekk, 2008) .
The economic perspective on the relationship between education and fertility (Becker, 1991) predicts the postponement of motherhood and fewer children for women with more formal schooling. Becker's New Home Economics approach to fertility presumes that tertiary educated women prioritise quality over quantity of children. Within this context, better educated women show higher economic independence and delay or completely forgo parenting due to larger opportunity costs of having children. Women with tertiary degrees tend to find better-paid jobs and a withdrawal from the labour market might lead to skill depreciation. Generally, the more educated a woman is, the harder it becomes to combine family and professional responsibilities.
According to a cultural explanation of low fertility, within the framework of the Second Demographic Transition theory (Van de Kaa, 1987; Lesthaeghe, 1995) , self-fulfillment is the main goal in life and having children is becoming less important. As a result, entry into marriage and having children are being postponed to later ages up until other goals in life, such as acquiring a desired level of education and a satisfactory position in the labor market, are met. A woman's level of education can influence social norms regarding family size to a notably large extent. Less educated women tend to marry earlier and are more prone to staying economically inactive and are, consequently, expected to have more children.
However, more recent research indicates that field of education might also play a role in understanding fertility behaviour. Some authors (Hoem et al., 2006a; 2006b) assert that the choice of a specific study discipline explains more of the variation in reproductive outcomes than does the completion of a certain level of education. So far, the idea has received relatively little research attention, especially in the former socialist countries in Europe. This is partly due to limited access to sufficiently detailed data. Numerous authors find that field of education significantly affects fertility decision making (Lappegård, Rønsen, 2005; Hoem et al., 2006a; 2006b; Martín-García, Baizán, 2006; Neyer, Hoem, 2008; Bagavos, 2010; Rønsen, Skrede, 2010; Van Bavel, 2010; Tesching, 2012; Begall, Mills, 2013; Michelmore, Musick, 2013) , even after controlling for level of education. They all argue that individuals trained to perform similar jobs resemble each other more as compared to individuals holding the same level of education. In other words, those sharing a specific field of education might represent a homogenous group in terms of preferences, exposure to labour market conditions and life course experiences.
Some professions appear to offer a family-friendly environment and provide flexible or even part-time hours of employment. Then again, other professions are associated with non-standard work schedules, possibly aggravating the use of formal childcare services. Furthermore, women taking longer parental leaves oftentimes face skill depreciation (Martín-García, Baizán, 2006) , which is largely the case in male dominant technical vocations (Hoem et al., 2006a) . Specialising in education, health and welfare apparently seems to act as a fertility booster (Lappegård, Rønsen, 2005; Hoem et al., 2006a; Neyer, Hoem, 2008; Bagavos, 2010; Tesching, 2012; Begall, Mills, 2013) . The odds of becoming a mother decrease among tertiary educated women who completed training in humanities and social sciences in Norway (Lappegård, Rønsen, 2005) . Academic orientations concerned with the care of individuals or those emphasising interpersonal skills positively influence the timing of first births in Spain (Martín-García, Baizán, 2006) . Additionally, fertility postponement is found to be more prevalent among female graduates from subject groups that are typically male dominant (Van Bavel, 2010) .
The choice of a specific study discipline shapes the social context both during and after formal schooling, thus showing the capacity to affect fertility preferences (Martín-García, Baizán, 2006; Van Bavel, 2010) . Still, field of education frequently conceals a considerable amount of occupational heterogeneity. Finally, as McDonald, Kippen (2009) argue, the relationship between field of education and reproductive behaviour could be spurious because family-oriented women are more likely to seek a degree which will, later on, dampen a possible work-family conflict.
Analytical Strategy Data
The data used in the present paper are drawn from the Census of Population, Households and Dwellings 2011 (CBS, 2016b) and refer to women 15 years old and older by year of birth and number of live-born children. Available information is further classified by marital status, level of education and field of education. The categories corresponding to these factors are: Marital status, : − never married − ever married Level of education, : − low − middle − high Field of education, : − general programmes − education − humanities and arts − social sciences, business and law − science 4 − engineering, manufacturing and construction − agriculture − health and welfare − services − other − no formal schooling. The analyses are restricted to women born between 1930 and 1970. The youngest analysed cohort was 40 years old at the time of data collection. We assume these women had mostly finished their reproductive careers and employ a common practice of disregarding a small share of fertility occurring at high childbearing ages (Kravdal, Rindfuss, 2008; Cohen et. al, 2011; Brzozowska, 2014) .
In order to ensure comparability across cohorts, marital status distinguishes between never married and ever married women. 5 The categories considered for level of education are based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED): 6 low (ISCED levels 0, 1, 2), middle (ISCED levels 3A, 3C), high (ISCED levels 5A, 5B, 6). Field of education is sorted into broad classes composed of subject groups showing similarities 6 and treats women with no formal schooling as a separate category.
Having the form a multidimensional array, the data serve as an input for calculating completed fertility rates 7 by several sociodemographic subgroups (as determined by all possible factor combinations). Cases with missing values on marital status, level of education and field of education are for current purposes excluded from the analyses. 4 The item is named so that it follows standard terminology and it refers to natural science. . 5 Older cohorts exhibit a larger proportion of widowed women. The ever-married category also includes currently married and divorced women. 6 The coding of educational categories uses the 1997 ISCED version (UNESCO, 2006) . 7 The highest birth order used is an open-ended group 19+. Women of unknown parity are removed prior to determining the total number of live-born children by particular sociodemographic subgroups.
Methods
After a brief review of trends in completed fertility rates in Croatia, we apply decomposition techniques (Das Gupta, 1978 ; also, see Kitagawa, 1955; Cho, Retherford, 1973) to study the components of the observed changes. There is no rule of thumb when choosing among a variety of decomposition methods (see e.g. Canudas Romo, 2003) . However, in this case, Das Gupta's (1978) approach offers some advantages: (1) it is straightforward and capable of handling any number of factors, (2) the results are independent of the order in which the effects of (multiple) factors are computed and (3) no interaction term is involved (hence, the interpretation is simpler). Within the proposed framework, completed fertility rates for cohorts and , and respectively, may be defined as
where denotes the sociodemographic composition and determines the sociodemographic subgroup (as dictated by all obtainable combinations of class variables). The difference between and is given as The structural component is additionally split into sole effects of constituent factors (see Das Gupta, 1978, pp. 104-105) . Expressions we obtain the estimates of desired effects. The acquired values represent averages of the figures derived from all possible orders in which the effects of examined factors can be computed.
The outlined decomposition procedures are repeated for all neighbouring cohorts in 5-year intervals. This reveals a temporal mechanism relating shifts in women's educational portrait to established fertility patterns in Croatia (while controlling for a gradually increasing prevalence of the never married female population).
Lastly, we conduct direct standardization (see e.g. Carmichael, 2016, pp. 55-73) to show how the would have behaved if the female population structure had remained constant and produce parity progression ratios (see e.g. Carmichael, 2016, pp. 287-292) to gain a more detailed assessment of the changes in reproductive outcomes across sociodemographic strata. Parity progression ratios capture the conditional probability of having another child (parity ) among women achieving a certain birth order (parity − 1). While it is possible to construct period parity progression ratios to discuss fertility trends (see e.g. Feeney, 1991) , existing literature recognises the deficiencies it holds as a demographic measure (Kohler, Ortega, 2002) and more usually relies on computations dealing with real female cohorts (see e.g. Frejka, Sardon, 2007) . We hereby also develop cohort parity progression ratios, namely 1, 2 and 3 with = number of women at parity or more number of women at parity − 1 or more , = 1, 2, 3 and expand the calculations over the main factors included in our analyses.
Results

Descriptive Findings
The educational expansion among cohorts of women under study is indisputable but completed fertility differentials appear to persist. As shown in Figure 1 , better educated women, on average, finished their reproductive careers with fewer children. Albeit mildly fluctuating, completed fertility of women with low education remained well above the replacement threshold. Their share, however, fell sharply from over 75% (cohort 1930) to less than 20% (cohort 1970) . For most of the cohorts, completed fertility of women with middle education actually rose (from 1.5 in 1930 to over 1.8 in 1970). An increase in completed fertility of women with high education occurred among older cohorts. Yet, it then levelled off and began to decline for women born after 1960, ultimately reaching a value of 1.4 (cohort 1970).
Figure 1 Completed fertility and distribution of women by cohort and level of education
The proportion of women with low education having no formal schooling dropped continuously across cohorts (from more than 15% in 1930 to barely 3% in 1970). Other women with low education are classified as having finished general programmes and their completed fertility went up from 2.1 (cohort 1930) to 2.4 (cohort 1970). A more elaborate review of completed fertility disaggregated by subject groups is provided for women with middle (Table 1) and high (Table 2) 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 The most notable change concerning the distribution of women with middle education refers to a diminishing fraction of training in general programmes, while completed fertility differentials exhibit some variation between cohorts. Referring to Table 1 , the largest contrast in completed fertility rates occurs within the 1960 cohort, with women educated in agriculture having, on average, 0.66 children more than women educated in humanities and arts. Expectedly, training in humanities and arts is associated with lower completed fertility (with the exception of the youngest cohort). However, women opting for this field of education take up a rather small share of the total as compared to other vocations.
Women with high education show a somewhat clearer pattern. Unsurprisingly, those trained to perform jobs in education are consistently found to have more children relative to other subject groups within the same cohorts. On the other hand, their proportion among women with high education almost halved in size across the observed cohort range. As indicated in Table 2 , completed fertility differentials by field of education were substantially more pronounced within the youngest cohort as compared to the oldest cohort. 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 Finally, Figure 2 presents completed fertility trends by marital status, as it is a factor included in our decomposition analyses. Although the share of 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 CFR Proportion of women % never married % ever married CFR never married CFR ever married unmarried women is gradually rising, especially within the youngest cohorts, the high prevalence of intermarriage reproduction is clearly visible.
Components of Cohort Fertility Differentials
The decomposition results are presented in this segment. The broadest conclusion concerning the oldest and the youngest cohort suggests that the structural effect strongly dominates the direct one (the upper panel of Table 3 ). More specifically, the changing composition of female population by marital status, level of education and field of education contributed to a decrease in the overall completed fertility by -0.724, while subgroup-specific rate increases amounting to 0.431 appear not to be strong enough to offset the aforementioned impact. In other words, completed fertility net of distributional changes in female population actually increased. A further decomposition of the combined effect of all considered factors seems to indicate that field of education played the most important role in the observed completed fertility decline: it accounts for over 40% of the total structural component. A more modest proportion of the structural component is attributed to changes in female distribution by marital status, which explains less than 25% of the total structural component. The findings pertaining to subsequent cohorts in 5-year intervals (the bottom panel of Table 3 ) show a persistently negative structural component, even over intervals which exhibit a positive change in completed fertility. The isolated effect of marital status turns from positive to negative and becomes largest in size among younger cohorts (1960 versus 1965, 1965 versus 1970) . On the other hand, the changing educational portrait of female population solely explains the decline in completed fertility among older cohorts (1930 versus 1935, 1935 versus 1940) and continues to be prevalent among women born before 1960. Figure 3 compares the observed completed fertility rates to their directly standardized counterparts. Had the female population structure by field of education remained constant, completed fertility would have actually risen (albeit slightly) from 2.13 (cohort 1930) to 2.26 (cohort 1970). The same applies to level of education, with the gap between the real and directly standardized completed fertility rates widening with time. A stable composition of female population by marital status would have been insufficient to keep completed fertility at or above the replacement level.
Figure 3 Actual and directly standardised completed fertility
The outcomes of a single multivariate decomposition -comparing the oldest and the youngest cohort and including each of the factor combinations -are, for space-related purposes, available in the Appendix (Table A1 ). The main drivers of completed fertility decline within the reference cohort range appear to be ever married women with low education. This conclusion is also confirmed by our analyses of successive cohorts in 5-year intervals, with Table 4 showing the most negative of the obtained structural component values. The share of least educated women fell sharply over the considered time span; this had a negative impact on completed fertility change because women with low education, on average, gave birth to more children. On the other hand, the proportion of better educated women rose considerably within the analysed period. Comparing the oldest and the youngest cohort, those women also exhibited an increase in completed fertility net of compositional changes. To gain a deeper insight on what is behind the observed upward shift, we present in Table 5 the decomposition outcomes by field of education separately for the upper level of education categories. Finally, Table 6 sets out the results from applying conventional direct standardisation procedures aimed at assessing the role of changes in the distribution of women by field of education on completed fertility behaviour. 
Parity Progression Ratios
Our results clearly indicate an overall completed fertility decline over the observed cohort range. Investigating cohort parity progression ratios yields a deeper understanding of the educational gradient in childbearing by birth order within the analysed time span.
In general, the proportion of women who became mothers is quite high for the majority of considered cohorts (Figure 4) . The largest probabilities of having a first child (amounting to over 90%) are, unsurprisingly, exhibited by women with low education but are closely followed by values referring to women with middle education. Even women with high education show a relatively high probability of having a first child and lag behind women with low education by less than 10 percentage points.
Progression to second births shows the largest educational differential within the oldest cohort. Its level gradually rose, with more pronounced increases visible among better educated women. While only about 50% of women with high education within the oldest cohort had a second child, the corresponding figure went up to over 70% within the 1945 cohort and then it levelled off.
Among women with low education, progression to higher order births is mildly u-shaped and reaches its minimum within the 1955 cohort. Only 20% of middle educated women born before 1950 gave birth to a third child. However, progression to third births thereafter began to rise, surpassing 30% within the youngest cohort. Progression ratios to parity three also show an upward tendency among women with high education and achieve values of over 20% within younger cohorts (1960, 1965, 1970) .
Figure 4 Cohort parity progression ratios by level of education
Source: Authors' calculations based on the 2011 Population Census data.
When considering cohort parity progression ratios by field of education ( Figure 5 ), a different pattern emerges. Recognising women with no formal education and women with general programme schooling as outliers, we find no substantial variation in cohort parity progression ratios among women who obtained training in particular disciplines. Women educated in science, humanities and arts may be, however, regarded as exceptions as they exhibited a somewhat lower progression to first and second births throughout the observed cohort range. 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 Cohorts with low education Cohorts with middle education Cohorts with high education PPR1 PPR2 PPR3
Figure 5 Cohort parity progression ratios by field of education
Discussion
Without thoroughly reviewing the estimated effects of all possible factor combinations used in the decomposition calculations, one might get a misleading impression on how the overall completed fertility decline is influenced by distributional changes in female population by level of education and field of education. Interestingly, as displayed in the Annex (see Table A1 ), the largest contributors to completed fertility change between the oldest and the youngest cohort are ever married women with low education (having some or no formal schooling). As a matter of fact, the majority of other structural component values are actually positive. Therefore, the observed completed fertility decline in Croatia is mostly attributable to a decreasing proportion of low educated women, whose completed fertility further increased over the analysed cohort range.
Perhaps surprisingly, the highest positive structural component values are found among ever married women who obtained training in engineering, manufacturing and construction, social sciences, business and law. These sociodemographic subgroups also exhibit an increase in completed fertility net of compositional changes in female population. 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 Cohort PPR1 The figures referring to successive cohorts in 5-year intervals confirm a fundamental role of a shrinking share of women with low education. A decreasing proportion of ever married women with no formal schooling is found to have the most negative effect among older cohorts (1930 versus 1935, 1935 versus 1940) , while a decreasing proportion of ever married women with low education in general programmes is found to have the most negative effect among younger cohorts (1940 versus 1945, 1945 versus 1950, 1950 versus 1955, 1955 versus 1960, 1960 versus 1965, 1965 versus 1970) .
Among women with middle education, social sciences, business and law, engineering, manufacturing and construction are found to be study disciplines with major contributions to the rise in completed fertility. The most negative compositional effect resulted from a lower proportion of training in general programmes but was completely counterbalanced by other positive values within the structural component. Furthermore, completed fertility would have increased even more had the proportion of women with secondary school degrees in education, health and welfare remained unchanged.
As for women with high education, the most pronounced contribution to the increase in completed fertility is attributable to those who chose to specialise in social sciences, business and law. The structural component takes on a negative value, primarily due to a decreased share of women who opted for training in teaching and education science. Engineering, manufacturing and construction is again shown to be responsible for a notable fraction of an upward completed fertility change.
Assuming a constant structure of female population by study discipline across cohorts, completed fertility of middle educated women would have not increased. On the contrary, it would have dropped slightly. Unexpectedly, completed fertility among highly educated women would have remained virtually unchanged if the distribution of female population by study discipline had stayed the same. Moreover, cohort parity progression ratios by field of education are closely in line with the corresponding values referring to order-specific fertility behaviour by level of education.
Conclusion
Popular explanations of aggregate fertility decline oftentimes link changes in childbearing outcomes to women's educational expansion. The results presented in this paper once again confirm the presence of such a relationship. We find that a decrease in completed fertility among Croatian women born between 1930 and 1970 is hugely attributable to improvements in female educational structure. Had the distribution of women by level of education remained constant, completed fertility would not have dropped; it would have stayed at or above the replacement level. This comes as no surprise within low fertility settings, especially among former socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Brzozowska, 2014; 2015) .
Completed fertility among women with low education remained quite stable throughout the analysed cohort range. On the other hand, completed fertility among women with middle and high education exhibited an overall increase. Educational differentials in completed fertility initially showed some signs of convergence but once again started to widen among cohorts of the 1960s. Women who gave birth in the late 1960s and during the 1970s, when Yugoslavia experienced positive economic growth (Sirotković, 1996) , exhibited more homogeneity in completed fertility by level of education. On the other hand, women who gave birth during the 1990s, when Croatia declared independence and faced a major economic downturn, exhibited notably larger educational differentials in completed fertility. These findings are in agreement with contemporary research evidence on the association between reproductive behaviour and economic environment (Sobotka et al., 2011) .
The results of our decomposition analyses reveal the dominance of the structural effect in explaining the overall completed fertility decline in Croatia. Married women with low education are shown to be the largest contributors to a downward shift in childbearing outcomes. Field of education was also introduced as a possible source of completed fertility differentials. We assumed that the changing distribution of women by field of education at least partially accounts for the observed patterns in completed fertility but found no strong evidence in support of the outlined hypothesis. A stable distribution of better educated women by field of education would have led to at best modest changes in completed fertility. One can speculate that field of education plays a minor role in the overall completed fertility change during the earlier stages of the educational expansion. Under such circumstances, the effect of choosing a particular study discipline appears to be completely counterbalanced by the influence of a shrinking proportion of women with least education. 
